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ALASKA’S INITIATIVE PROCESS:
THE BENEFITS OF ADVANCE
OVERSIGHT AND A
RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE
Logan T. Mohs*
ABSTRACT
Alaska’s initiative process is unique—Alaska is the only state with a robust
initiative culture and advance oversight over the content of initiatives by the
Lieutenant Governor. This state of affairs is appropriate because it recognizes
both the savings to the state and the benefit to citizens that advance oversight
can achieve. It also places the power of advance oversight in the hands of the
individual most qualified in Alaska to wield it. However, despite being
generally commendable, the Alaskan initiative oversight process is not
perfect. Because the Lieutenant Governor has this unique power, it is
inappropriate for them to be elected on the same ticket with the Governor.
This Note proposes that the Lieutenant Governor and Governor positions
should be more distinct, by holding separate elections for the two offices and
by establishing a standardized line of succession to the fill vacancies in the
office of the Lieutenant Governor. On the way to this conclusion, this Note
discusses a number of factors that should be considered before any change to
the initiative process is made. The proposed change, however, does not run
afoul of any of the concerns over changing the initiative process, and therefore
should be adopted.

INTRODUCTION
Over the past hundred years, direct democracy has established
itself as a key component of the American system. Thirty-four states and
the District of Columbia have some process for initiatives, recalls, or
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referenda.1 As a result, approximately 203 million people, more than 275
times the population of Alaska,2 are able to direct their government
through ballot actions on individual issues.
While the pervasiveness of direct democracy around the country
may at first appear to negate any special claim Alaska might have to the
process, Alaska is unique in that the Lieutenant Governor alone has the
power to prevent an unconstitutional initiative from reaching the ballot.3
Protecting Alaskan citizens’ constitutional rights against the will of a
temporary majority within the state is vital.4 However, placing a
metaphorical shield in the hands of a single elected individual rather
than in the courts is much less clearly commendable.5
This Note will argue that the Alaskan system should be preserved,
despite its acknowledged shortcomings, but that the legislature should
make some minor modifications. This Note will not address the more
fundamental question of whether or not direct democracy itself is a
beneficial or admirable aspect of a government. Instead, beginning with
the presumption that some sort of direct democracy should exist in the
form of initiative legislation, this Note will explore the Alaskan system
and make some minor proposals for change, without arguing for either
the overhaul or abolition of the system as a whole.
The following Parts will each focus on different aspects of the
Alaskan initiative process. To set up a framework for understanding
how and why the Alaskan initiative process works as it does, Part I
examines the Alaska Supreme Court decision of DesJarlais v. State, Office
of Lieutenant Governor,6 which determined that the Lieutenant

1. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Washington, D.C., Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 35–36 (2009).
2. United States Census Bureau, Population Div., Annual Estimates of the
Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July
1, 2013 (NST-EST2013-01), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/
totals/2013/tables/NST-EST2013-01.xls (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
3. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.080 (2012) (“The lieutenant governor shall deny
certification [of an initiative] . . . .”) (emphasis added).
4. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (demonstrating a concern
with “the superior force of an uninterested and overbearing majority” and
noting that “there is nothing [in a pure democracy] to check the inducements [of
a majority] to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.”).
5. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“I agree, that ‘there is
no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
executive powers.’”) (quoting 1 MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 186 (n.p.
1748)).
6. 300 P.3d 900 (Alaska 2013).
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Governor’s had the power to refuse to place a particular initiative on the
ballot. Part II looks at the history of the initiative oversight process in
Alaska by examining various lawsuits similar to DesJarlais. Part III
examines other states’ initiative oversight processes to demonstrate
what makes the Alaskan method so special. Part IV argues both that the
initiative process should have strong oversight in some form, and that
the office of the Lieutenant Governor should perform that oversight.
Lastly, Part V argues that the legislature should be hesitant to make
changes to Alaska’s system, paying particular attention to the reasons
for maintaining strong oversight addressed in Part IV. However, Part V
does also argue for a single minor change to the election code that
would alleviate at least one potential problem.

I.

DESJARLAIS V. STATE, OFFICE OF LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR

In late 2010, Clinton DesJarlais filed an application with the Alaska
Office of the Lieutenant Governor to certify his initiative relating to
abortion.7 The “Natural Right to Life” initiative proposed would have
added a new section to the Alaska Statutes declaring that “the natural
right to life and body of the unborn child supercedes [sic] the statutory
right of the mother to consent to the injury or death of her unborn
child.”8 The initiative also provided that “the law of necessity shall
dictate between the life of the mother and her child” in life-threatening
situations.9
Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell asked the Department of
Law to ensure that DesJarlais’s application complied with Alaska’s
initiative process as laid out by statute.10 After determining that the
proposed initiative would be clearly unconstitutional,11 the Department
of Law recommended that Lieutenant Governor Treadwell deny the
application.12 Treadwell accepted the recommendation and did just that.
Subsequently, DesJarlais sued.13

7. Id. at 901; Initiative Petition List, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS,
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/pbi_ini_status_list.php#10NRTL (last visited
Sept. 17, 2014).
8. DesJarlais, 300 P.3d at 901; 10NRTL Sponsor Language, STATE OF ALASKA
DIV. OF ELECTIONS, available at http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/
10NRTL/10NRTL_Sponsor_Language.pdf
[hereinafter
10NRTL
Sponsor
Language] (last visited Sept. 17, 2014).
9. DesJarlais, 300 P.3d at 901; 10NRTL Sponsor Language, supra note 8.
10. DesJarlais, 300 P.3d at 901.
11. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a woman’s right
to privacy).
12. DesJarlais, 300 P.3d at 902.
13. Id.
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The Alaska Supreme Court held that DesJarlais’s initiative was
clearly unconstitutional, and therefore that Lieutenant Governor
Treadwell’s denial was appropriate.14 The court examined United States
Supreme Court precedent and determined that “DesJarlais’s proposed
bill would preclude abortion to at least the same extent as the Texas
criminal statutes at issue in Roe v. Wade.”15 Indeed, because DesJarlais’s
initiative contained no exception to the prohibition based on maternal
safety, instead providing for the “law of necessity” to govern in a
criminal prosecution, it prohibited abortion to an even greater level than
the statute in Roe.16 Because abortion would be restricted even more than
the Supreme Court had previously held unconstitutional, DesJarlais’s
initiative was clearly unconstitutional.
In deciding DesJarlais, the Alaska Supreme Court held that “[t]he
State can refuse to certify an initiative where controlling authority
establishes its unconstitutionality.”17 This power is based in the Alaska
Constitution and its initiative statutes. The Alaska Constitution allows
the people to exercise only a subset of “the law-making powers assigned
to the legislature.”18 And while a general rule exists in Alaska that
prevents review of an initiative’s constitutionality before enactment, that
rule does not apply when the initiative is challenged as being clearly
unconstitutional, for reasons discussed in detail in Part II.19
Lieutenant Governor Treadwell’s action in denying DesJarlais’s
application was therefore an appropriate use of his statutory authority
over initiatives.20 The Lieutenant Governor may deny a proposed
initiative that would be clearly unconstitutional under current
controlling authority.

II. THE HISTORY OF INITIATIVE OVERSIGHT IN ALASKA
DesJarlais was hardly the first time that the issue of denying an
initiative has arisen. Since the state’s founding, Alaskan citizens have
put forward 179 initiative applications.21 Of these, forty-nine have
appeared on a ballot, fifty-four were successful but did not appear on
14. Id. at 904–05.
15. Id. at 904.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 11.
19. DesJarlais, 300 P.3d at 903.
20. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.080 (2012) (granting the Lieutenant Governor
the power to deny certification of an initiative petition).
21. Initiative History, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS, http://
www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2014);
Initiative Petition List, supra note 7.
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the ballot, and seventy-two were denied or withdrawn.22 Four initiative
applications are currently active.23 These numbers, last updated by the
Division of Elections prior to the November 2014 election, only reflect
statewide initiatives and not those proposed as local ordinances.24
All initiatives are subject to the constitutional and statutory
restrictions and requirements imposed on direct legislation. Outside of
those limitations, an initiative may, in general, cover any subject that the
legislature can affect.25 However, it may not deal with some specific
matters, such as dedicating revenues, creating or defining the
jurisdiction of courts, or local or special legislation.26 To be approved by
the Lieutenant Governor, an initiative must be confined to a single
subject, must have that subject expressed in the title, must have an
enacting clause, and must not include any restricted subject.27 Municipal
initiatives must also “be enforceable as a matter of law.”28
In 1974, the Alaska Supreme Court decided Boucher v. Engstrom,29
which involved an initiative to relocate the state capital.30 The case was
brought, however, before the vote on the initiative occurred.31 The court,
relying on assumptions present in Starr v. Hagglund32 and Walter v.
Cease,33 explicitly held that “our courts are empowered to review an
initiative to ascertain whether it complies with the particular
constitutional and statutory provisions regulating initiatives.”34 In
support of this holding, the court noted the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court’s decision in Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,35
which held that “[u]nless the courts [have] power to enforce those
exclusions [provided by the people], they would be futile.”36
In 1999, Brooks v. White37 clarified the holding of Boucher. Review of
an initiative before its enactment is appropriate only when inquiring
whether the initiative complies with constitutional and statutory

22. Initiative History, supra note 21.
23. Initiative Petition List, supra note 7.
24. Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.030 (2012) (requiring home rule charters to
provide procedures for initiatives).
25. ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 11.
26. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7.
27. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.040, 15.45.080 (2012).
28. ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.110 (2012).
29. 528 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1974).
30. Id. at 458.
31. Id. at 458–59.
32. 374 P.2d 316 (Alaska 1962).
33. 394 P.2d 670 (Alaska 1964).
34. Boucher, 528 P.2d at 460.
35. 69 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1946).
36. Id. at 128.
37. 971 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1999).
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requirements and limitations on what the initiative must and may
contain.38 However, review of the constitutionality of the provisions
within an initiative is inappropriate.39
In 2001, Edward Mahoney filed an initiative with his municipal
clerk that would have imposed term limits on the Mayor of Kodiak
Island Borough.40 The clerk refused to place this initiative on the ballot
because she was unable to conclude that it would be enforceable as a
matter of law.41 The Alaska Supreme Court made clear, however, that
the issue is not whether the clerk could conclude with certainty that the
initiative was constitutional, but rather, based on controlling authority,
she could conclude with certainty that it was not constitutional.42
The court compared its holding in Kodiak Island Borough with the
ability of executive agencies to hold state statutes unconstitutional. In
Alaska, “the executive branch may abrogate a statute which is clearly
unconstitutional under a United States Supreme Court decision dealing
with a similar law, without having to wait for another court decision.”43
The court in Kodiak Island Borough granted that same authority to
municipal clerks in regard to rejecting initiative proposals.44
In State v. Trust the People,45 the court alluded to the idea that the
Kodiak Island Borough advance oversight was exercisable by the
Lieutenant Governor, and that the office was not simply limited to
abrogating already enacted statutes.46 Trust the People involved an
initiative that would have repealed the Governor’s ability to make a
temporary appointment to fill a United States Senate vacancy.47 The
state argued that this initiative would violate the 17th Amendment.48
The court, however, refused to allow the Lieutenant Governor to decline
to place the initiative on the ballot himself.49 Instead, the court held that
pre-election review and oversight was only allowed in cases where
Alaska law “expressly addresses and restricts Alaska’s constitutionallyestablished initiative process,” or where the proposal is “clearly

38. Id. at 1027.
39. Id.
40. Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 897 (Alaska 2003).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 900.
43. O’Callaghan v. Coghill, 888 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Alaska 1995).
44. 71 P.3d at 900.
45. 113 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2005).
46. See id. at 624 (failing to reference any possible prior limitation).
47. Id. at 620.
48. Id. at 624; see U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“[T]he legislature of any State
may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments.”)
(emphasis added).
49. Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 629.
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unlawful under controlling authority,” which the one at issue was not.50
The court therefore drew on Kodiak Island Borough’s holding and applied
the standard used there for municipal clerks to the Lieutenant
Governor.51
The next year, the Alaska Supreme Court decided Kohlhaas v. State,
Office of Lieutenant Governor.52 In Kohlhaas, the court reviewed an
initiative that would have allowed Alaskans to vote to secede from the
United States.53 Unlike in Trust the People, the court in Kohlhaas upheld
the Lieutenant Governor’s decision to decline to certify the initiative
petition, because it dealt with a clearly unconstitutional subject.54 While
Kohlhaas argued that his initiative was not clearly unconstitutional
because no specific provision in either the Alaska or United States
Constitutions prohibits secession, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on
United States Supreme Court precedent to determine that secession was
in fact clearly unconstitutional.55
Alaska’s path to recognizing the Lieutenant Governor’s ability to
exercise advance oversight over the initiative process was therefore a bit
circuitous. Boucher acknowledged pre-election review by the courts, and
clarified the concept in Brooks, but such review was limited to ensuring
compliance with the constitutional and statutory provisions governing
the technical procedure of the initiative process.56 Similarly, the
executive’s ability to abrogate an unquestionably unconstitutional
statute, recognized in O’Callaghan, did not clearly extend to proposed
laws, but instead simply allowed the executive to react to rulings by the
Supreme Court and abrogate existing laws.57
The ability to abrogate, however, made sense to transfer to
municipal clerks dealing with initiative applications because of the
requirement that a municipal initiative be enforceable as a matter of
law.58 If an initiative was clearly unconstitutional, it would not be
enforceable, and therefore the abrogation could occur before, rather than
after, passage. Trust the People brought pre-election oversight back
around to apply to the Lieutenant Governor.59 There, the court
recognized two instances for pre-election review: in addition to the
50. See id.
51. See id. at 628–29.
52. 147 P.3d 714 (Alaska 2006).
53. Id. at 715–16.
54. Id. at 720.
55. Id. at 715–16, 718–20.
56. Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 460 (Alaska 1974); Brooks v. White,
971 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Alaska 1999).
57. O’Callaghan v. Coghill, 888 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Alaska 1995).
58. Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 900 (Alaska 2003).
59. State v. Trust the People, 113 P.3d 613, 624–25 (Alaska 2005).
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subject-matter restrictions acknowledged in Boucher and Brooks, the
Lieutenant Governor also had the power to refuse to place on the ballot
a clearly unconstitutional initiative, just as municipal clerks had since
Kodiak Island Borough.60 Although Trust the People overturned the
Lieutenant Governor’s decision, both Kohlhaas and DesJarlais affirmed
his denial of an initiative petition because both secession and abolishing
abortion are clearly unconstitutional.61 Therefore, advance initiative
oversight by the Lieutenant Governor, which was once considered
inappropriate, was justified by first routing that power through
municipal clerks who operated under a different set of statutory
obligations.62

III. INITIATIVE OVERSIGHT IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
While Alaska is not the only state that allows its citizens to create
laws through the initiative process, its granting of advance initiative
oversight to an elected official is rare. As noted above, thirty-four states
and the District of Columbia have some provision allowing for a form of
direct democracy.63 Of those, twenty-four states and the District allow
the ballot initiative.64
The most common method of oversight in these states is simply to
ensure that the initiatives have taken the correct form. Eight states
require the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or a special council
to review an initiative petition in this manner.65 Nine states have some
60. Id. at 614 n.1.
61. Id. at 629; Kohlhaas v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor, 147 P.3d 714,
720 (Alaska 2006); DesJarlais v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor, 300 P.3d
900, 904–05 (Alaska 2013).
62. The correctness of this line of reasoning is beyond the scope of this Note.
While certainly great deference should be afforded to the Alaska Supreme Court
in its jurisprudence here, there is a strong argument that could be made that
Trust the People and Kohlhaas were based on a faulty assumption that municipal
clerks and the Lieutenant Governor operate under the same authority. In reality
however, the requirement of enforceability is only present for municipal
initiatives. While a further exploration of this discrepancy and a call for
reconsidering the state of initiative law since Trust the People may be warranted,
it is left to future authors to address. This Note instead focuses on the policy
reasons why advance oversight by the Lieutenant Governor is desirable, rather
than the legal justification for such oversight.
63. See supra note 1 (listing states that have some process for initiatives,
recalls, or referenda).
64. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,
Washington, Washington, D.C., and Wyoming. MILLER, supra note 1, at 36.
65. Arizona, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Wyoming. M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC
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form of non-binding, content-based oversight.66 This form of review
includes public hearings, content reviews that the sponsor may reject,
and assistance from state bodies.67 While seven states have some form of
mandatory content review,68 only Alaska, Massachusetts, and Utah
allow a single individual—in Massachusetts the Attorney General, and
in Alaska and Utah the Lieutenant Governor—to substantively modify
or reject a proposed initiative based on the subject matter.69
Massachusetts, however, only limits initiatives that deal with
specifically delineated subject matters or which infringe upon the rights
of individuals as established in the state constitution; Massachusetts
does not limit initiatives that are contrary to the United States
Constitution or decisions of the Supreme Court.70
Alaska and Utah are therefore the only states in which a single
individual can refuse to place an initiative on the ballot based on the
federal constitutionality of the initiative’s content before that initiative is
enacted. However, Utah’s history with initiatives is less robust than
Alaska’s. Early restrictions such as having to sign all petitions “in the
office and in the presence of an officer to administer oaths,” and recent
legislation increasing distribution requirements, have resulted in Utah
only voting on eighteen initiatives through 2003—despite having the
initiative for fifty-nine years before Alaska became a state.71 As such,
Alaska is the only state with a meaningful initiative process where an
individual has the ability to review and reject initiatives prior to their
enactment based on their federal constitutionality.

IV. THE ALASKAN INITIATIVE SYSTEM, WITH STRONG
OVERSIGHT BY THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, IS BENEFICIAL AND
COMMENDABLE
Assuming initiatives themselves are desirable, Alaska’s laws
surrounding initiative oversight are beneficial for two reasons. First,
advance oversight in general, by some agency or individual, is
preferable to the situation that would exist without such oversight.

15 (2003).
66. California, Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio,
South Dakota, and Washington. Id.
67. Id.
68. Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Utah. Id.
69. Id. While Idaho requires the Attorney General to review content, his or
her recommendations are purely advisory. IDAHO CODE ANN. 34-1809(1)(b)
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.).
70. MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. II, § 2.
71. WATERS, supra note 65, at 400.
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Second, instilling the oversight power in the Lieutenant Governor,
rather than in the court system or any other body, allows the political
process to check the use of that power.
A.

Advance Initiative Oversight Should Exist In Some Way

There are two primary reasons why advance oversight of popular
initiatives is advantageous to Alaska. First, advance oversight prevents
the waste of state resources on elections that will have no actual effects.
Second, advance oversight prevents unconstitutional initiatives from
being in effect for even a fraction of time, during which constitutional
violations could occur.
Running an election is costly,72 and passing a clearly
unconstitutional amendment would likely result in “needless
litigation.”73 While the courts “are primarily responsible for
constitutional adjudication,” allowing another person to make that
judgment, when the initiative is clearly unconstitutional, saves time and
money at both the electoral and litigation stages.74
Furthermore, advance oversight of the initiative process prevents
unconstitutional laws from taking effect, even for a limited time. If a
clearly unconstitutional initiative is prevented from being voted on, it
cannot be enacted.75 If it is not enacted, it cannot be enforced. And if it
cannot be enforced, no constitutional violation can occur.
Imposing a strong check on unconstitutional initiatives before they
have the chance of taking effect preserves constitutional freedoms and
liberties. For example, an initiative completely banning abortion would
presumably prevent at least some women from receiving their
constitutionally guaranteed medical care.76 It would be wrong to allow
that important constitutional right to be infringed until a case can make
its way through the judicial system. It is better for rights like this to
never be stripped away in the first place, rather than simply having

72. See, e.g., State and Consumer Initiatives, The High Price of Uncontested
Elections, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 26, 2013), http://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/news/2013/11/26/the-high-priceof-uncontested-elections (describing various election costs for specific local
contests as between $10,000 and $100,000).
73. Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 900 (Alaska 2003).
74. Id.
75. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.220 (2012) (stating that a proposed law is
enacted only when the majority of votes cast favor adoption—with no votes
there can be no majority).
76. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (“A state criminal abortion
statute of the current Texas type . . . is violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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them reinstated after their removal.
This is especially important for rights that may be unable to be
recovered once lost. A woman seeking an abortion may have to endure
her entire pregnancy while an unconstitutional initiative banning
abortion is in effect. Alternatively, she could seek an illegal abortion,
which would pose its own risks.77 Either way, a court decision that
strikes down the initiative only after extended litigation would be of
little help to her. Therefore, not only does advance oversight of the
constitutionality of initiatives preserve rights generally, it also is the
only method of guaranteeing at least some those rights and preventing
possibly irreversible harms.
However, a determination that a proposed initiative is
unconstitutional made before it takes effect “is necessarily advisory,”78
and therefore judicial review is generally unavailable.79 Even though
this Note considers administrative and executive review, rather than
judicial review, that difference does not eliminate the general concern
about the quality of a decision made without a specific case and factpattern to be argued by parties with a genuine interest at stake.
But while the difference between executive and judicial review
might not change the advisory-opinion analysis, the reasons for
requiring a specific case do not apply when the initiative at issue is
clearly unconstitutional. The reason for that is simple: the legal question
is settled and the debate is done. Specific laws may be written in such a
way that it is questionable as to whether or not the precedent would
apply, but at that point they cease to be clearly unconstitutional.80 Only
when
“controlling
authority
establishes
[an
initiative’s]
unconstitutionality” should it be excluded from the ballot.81 Making that
determination beforehand does not require any specific facts beyond the
text of the proposed law itself.82
77. See The Safety of Legal Abortion and the Hazards of Illegal Abortion, NARAL
PRO-CHOICE AMERICA 2, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/factsheets/abortion-distorting-science-safety-legal-abortion.pdf (“The legalization of
abortion in the United States led to the near elimination of deaths from the
procedure.”) (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
78. Kohlhaas v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor, 147 P.3d 714, 717
(Alaska 2006).
79. See id. (stating only two grounds for judicial review in this context).
80. See Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 992
(Alaska 2004) (stating that a measure should be rejected only if controlling
authority unequivocally asserts its unconstitutionality); Carmony v. McKechnie,
217 P.3d 818, 820 (Alaska 2009) (requiring that an initiative be liberally construed
in considering its constitutionality).
81. Kodiak Island Borough, 71 P.3d at 900.
82. See id. (referring to a clerk determining the enforceability of an initiative
during the petition stage, therefore implicitly not requiring the facts of any
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Therefore, because advance oversight of the initiative process saves
time, effort, and money for the state and its citizens, and because only
through advance oversight can constitutional violations be prevented,
Alaska’s establishment of such oversight is commendable.
B.

The Lieutenant Governor Should Exercise Advance Oversight
Over Initiatives

Assuming that advance oversight over the initiative process is
valuable, the question then arises as to who exactly should have that
oversight power. Alaska’s choice to vest the Lieutenant Governor with
the power to prevent clearly unconstitutional initiatives from being
placed on the ballot is a wise decision for three reasons, one of which is
uniquely Alaskan and two of which are generally applicable to any
other state considering enacting an advance-oversight provision.
The first reason—unique to Alaska—is that, by virtue of his or her
office, the Lieutenant Governor is the elected official in charge of
statewide elections.83 Other states typically designate an official such as
the Secretary of State to oversee elections,84 but Alaska eliminated its
Secretary of State position in 1970, re-designating and renaming it the
Lieutenant Governor.85
As the controller and supervisor of the Division of Elections,86 it is
appropriate for the Lieutenant Governor to be the individual making the
determination of whether or not a proposed initiative is clearly
unconstitutional. This is a significant responsibility, and not one to be

specific instance of enforcement).
83. Duties of the Lieutenant Governor, OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
MEAD TREADWELL, http://ltgov.alaska.gov/treadwell/lieutenant-governor/lt.governor-duties.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
84. See, e.g., Secretary’s Duties, OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA SEC’Y OF STATE
MARK RITCHIE, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page=1456 (last visited
Sept. 17, 2014) (“The secretary of state is the state’s chief election official and
ensures the office meets its statutory responsibilities.”); Elections and Voting,
DEPT. OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, BUREAU OF CORPS., ELECTIONS & COMMISSION, STATE
OF MAINE, https://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/index.html (last visited Jan.
11, 2014) (“The Division supervises and administers all elections of federal, state
and county offices and referenda . . . .”). But see UTAH LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
SPENCER J. COX, http://www.utah.gov/ltgovernor/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2014)
(listing “Elections” under the Lieutenant Governor’s “Responsibilities”). As
discussed above, however, Utah’s restrictive initiative regulations make Alaska
a better example of a state with true constitutional initiative oversight vested
with the Lieutenant Governor. See supra Part IV.
85. Article 3 – The Executive, OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR MEAD
TREADWELL, http://ltgov.alaska.gov/treadwell/services/alaska-constitution/
article-iii-96A0the-executive.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
86. Id.
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entrusted to anyone further down in the administrative hierarchy. While
other states that are considering allowing an individual to stop an
initiative from reaching the ballot should delegate such power to their
Secretary of State or other elected official, the Lieutenant Governor is
most suited for that task in Alaska.
Second, the Lieutenant Governor is an elected official and is
accountable to the people.87 Unlike an appointed official or individual
serving in an administrative position, the Lieutenant Governor has a
unique connection to the voters themselves and is best able to know and
effectuate their wishes. Allowing some other individual, disconnected
from the voting public, to exercise oversight over the initiative process
would be a form of fairly extreme counter-majoritarianism.88 Since the
people directly choose the Lieutenant Governor,89 a public concerned
about an abuse of oversight power would be able to select a different
individual who was able to assuage their worries. Similarly, if the
current Lieutenant Governor were to overstep his or her authority and
strike down initiative after initiative without regard for whether or not
they truly were clearly unconstitutional, the public would be able to
vote a new person into office at the next election.90 Thus, the political
nature of the Lieutenant Governor weighs in favor of having him or her
be the decision-maker with regards to placing initiatives on the ballot.
Third, the Lieutenant Governor is the appropriate individual to
control what initiatives appear on the ballot because he or she occupies a
high-profile position in which any abuse of power would be noticed.
The same cannot necessarily be said of a lesser office, even an elected
one, which may be less visible. Even the members of the Alaska
Supreme Court, while high-profile as a collective institution, may not
carry the individualized name-recognition needed to check an abuse of
power. Furthermore, a decision by that court to refuse an initiative’s
appearance on the ballot would involve multiple justices, each of whom
might share a part of the blame.91 With the power in the hands of the
Lieutenant Governor, however, there is no question about who made a
mistake (if one was in fact made). The voters would be able to assign

87. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8.
88. See Michael Richard Dimino, Sr., Counter-Majoritarian Power and Judges’
Political Speech, 58 FLA. L. REV. 53, 95–96 (2006) (describing how a Supreme Court
Justice’s vote to strike down an initiative would indicate a Justice’s countermajoritarian inclinations).
89. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8.
90. See id., § 7 (“He shall . . . serve for the same term [as the governor.]”); id.,
§ 4 (“The term of office of the governor is four years . . . .”).
91. All majority decisions must include at least three justices because three
justices constitute a quorum. ALASKA R. APP. P. 105(a).
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blame where it was properly due and react accordingly.
All this is not to say that there are no potential problems with
assigning the power to refuse to place an initiative on the ballot to the
Lieutenant Governor. However, the arguments in favor of the
Lieutenant Governor retaining control over placing initiatives on the
ballot outweigh the arguments that the Lieutenant Governor is the
wrong individual to entrust with this responsibility.
One danger with allowing the Lieutenant Governor to have the
power to prevent an initiative from moving forward is that it seems to
defeat the very reason the initiative exists. The initiative was first
introduced, at least in part, as a way for citizens to create laws without
having to worry about corruption in the legislative and executive
branches.92 When the Lieutenant Governor is involved in the initiative
process, however, this bypass around corruption is less effective.
This argument is not persuasive, however, for two reasons. First,
despite appearances, the Lieutenant Governor is not actually a part of
the system the initiative process was meant to bypass. The Lieutenant
Governor has no hand in the law-making process and is therefore not
subject to the same level of distrust as the Governor or legislature would
be. While it is true that in Alaska the Governor and Lieutenant Governor
run on the same ticket,93 the assumption that this alone makes the
Lieutenant Governor unfit for this task condemns him based on his
associations rather than his own deeds.
Second, even if the line between the Lieutenant Governor and the
political organs the initiative is meant to bypass were still too narrow for
comfort, the decision of the Lieutenant Governor to refuse to put an
initiative question on the ballot is reviewable by the courts.94 The
Lieutenant Governor is therefore checked in his ability to manipulate the
system and to squash the will of the people. This judicial review of the
Lieutenant Governor’s oversight, however, does not simply fold
Alaska’s system into the same mold as that of some other states. For
example, Florida’s supreme court is the body that makes the
constitutional determination initially, while Alaska’s court can only
92. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 23 (“[Many Americans in the 1890s] believed
that the government had been captured by powerful economic interests and . . .
the constitutional design prevented majorities from breaking the corrupt axis of
economic and political power”). But see RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS:
THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 177 (2002) (“This mythic portrayal
exaggerates the corruption of state legislatures.”). Exaggeration, however, does
not mean there is not a grain of truth to the story.
93. See ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8 (“The candidate whose name appears on
the ballot jointly with that of the successful candidate for governor shall be
elected lieutenant governor.”).
94. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 2.
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review a determination already made by the Lieutenant Governor.95
Therefore, while the courts can check the Lieutenant Governor’s power,
he or she still possesses the ability to prevent an initiative from
appearing on the ballot, unlike in states like Florida.
Another possible danger with allowing the Lieutenant Governor to
exercise this sort of initiative oversight is the fact that the public does not
vote for the Lieutenant Governor directly. While the Lieutenant
Governor is an elected position, Alaska uses a joint ticket system for the
Governor and Lieutenant Governor offices.96 A voter is therefore unable
to cast a vote for the Gubernatorial candidate from one ticket and the
Lieutenant Governor candidate from another.
This joint-election arrangement would not be much of a problem if
the role of the Lieutenant Governor were simply to advise the Governor,
but the position in Alaska has many independent responsibilities,
including overseeing the Division of Elections.97 It is conceivable that an
individual voter may prefer one individual for Governor but disagree
with that individual’s choice of who should run the Division of
Elections. Therefore, the connection between the two offices’ elections is
concerning. However, this problem could be solved by the adoption of
the proposal in Part V, and therefore while it may engender academic
concern for now, it is easily rectifiable by the people of Alaska if they so
choose.
Yet another concern with the Lieutenant Governor having the
power to stop initiatives before they reach the ballot is that the
Lieutenant Governor’s powers are largely granted by law rather than by
the Alaska Constitution.98 Those laws, and the Lieutenant Governor’s
powers with them, can be made or altered by the people through
initiatives.99 Therefore the Lieutenant Governor has the ability to reject
an initiative that would directly pertain to his or her own powers and
duties.
There are two possible problems that this could cause. First, the
Lieutenant Governor could prevent an initiative that would limit the
office’s powers in order to retain as much control and authority over the
government as possible. This sort of institutional power-grabbing has a
long tradition in the United States,100 and it is inconceivable that no
95. WATERS, supra note 65, at 48, 176.
96. ALASKA CONST. art III, § 8.
97. ALASKA STAT. § 15.10.105(a) (2012).
98. ALASKA CONST. art III, § 7. But see ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 2 (assigning
the power to certify initiatives to the Lieutenant Governor).
99. ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 11.
100. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (describing how assigning
various powers to various branches allows those branches to resist
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Lieutenant Governor would ever be tempted to prevent some aspect of
his or her authority from being stripped. The second problem is that
some particular Lieutenant Governor may not want an initiative to
expand the powers and responsibilities of the office, either because of the
simple laziness of the individual currently in office, or because of his or
her political views. A libertarian-leaning Lieutenant Governor, for
example, may be philosophically opposed to most government
activity,101 and an increase in responsibility would be antithetical to that
position. As such, the Lieutenant Governor may prevent an initiative
from reaching the voters simply because it would expand the powers of
the office beyond what the current officer believes they should be,
despite the possibility that the people themselves desire more from their
government.
These problems, however, are ameliorated by the fact that the
courts can review the decision of the Lieutenant Governor. This
oversight-of-the-oversight means that the Lieutenant Governor’s own
personal feelings—based in greed, laziness, or political alignment—will
be unable to control whether or not an initiative makes it to the ballot.
Only when an initiative is clearly unconstitutional, under existing
controlling precedent, will a court uphold the Lieutenant Governor’s
decision to prevent it from coming to a vote.102
Therefore, while valid and serious concerns about the Lieutenant
Governor’s power to prevent initiatives from appearing on the ballot do
exist, those concerns do not outweigh the benefits when they are
properly weighed with their solutions. The Lieutenant Governor, by
virtue of his or her high-profile political position, and by virtue of his or
her authority over the Division of Elections, is the ideal individual to
oversee voter initiatives. That, combined with the time, effort, and
monetary savings advance oversight generates, and the fact that
advance oversight of unconstitutional initiatives will prevent
constitutional violations from taking place while a challenge works its
way through the court, make Alaska’s initiative process highly
commendable.

encroachments of the others and how ambitions counteract)
101. See generally Libertarian Party Platform, LIBERTARIAN PARTY 1 (MAY 2012)
https://www.lp.org/files/LP%20Platform%202012.pdf
(“[Libertarians]
challenge the cult of the omnipotent state.”).
102. DesJarlais v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor, 300 P.3d 900, 903
(Alaska 2013).
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V. WHILE RESTRICTIONS ON THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR’S
ADVANCE INITIATIVE OVERSIGHT MUST BE IMPOSED WITH CARE,
ONE CHANGE IS WARRANTED
As argued in Part IV, the current laws surrounding the Lieutenant
Governor’s oversight of the initiative process are beneficial to the state
and people of Alaska. With that in mind, any change to these laws must
be made cautiously and with a full understanding of the potential
ramifications. That does not mean that no changes are warranted, but it
does mean that, in proposing any modification, one must fully outline
(1) exactly what the change would do, (2) why it would improve some
aspect of the process, and (3) how it would protect against any negative
effects. This Part will argue for one such change—splitting the elections
of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor—and address these three
areas. However, this Part will first address two concerns associated with
any changes calling for a reduction in the amount of initiative process
oversight.
Because there are two main reasons why advance initiative
oversight in general is beneficial (as discussed in the Part IV) any
attempt to restrict that oversight power must recognize and address
those issues. First, no change should be made to the initiative oversight
process unless that change does not lead to a waste in state resources.
Second, no change should be made unless the constitutional rights of the
people, especially those likely to be subject to discrimination, are
protected.
While certainly nothing legally prevents the state from eliminating
this prior oversight—or even eliminating the initiative in its entirety—
practical concerns over how the state would be affected do. Because
advance oversight over initiatives saves Alaska time, money, and
effort,103 it would be unwise to make any change which would do away
with those savings. Eliminating advance oversight of the initiative
process would allow more initiatives to reach the ballot, which alone
would increase the cost of elections. Assuming any of those initiatives
passed into law, the resulting lawsuits would further consume the
resources of the Alaskan judicial system. That in turn would result in
either a heavier burden to the taxpayers (to pay for the additional staff
needed for the increase in work), or in a reduction in the quality of
service (because judges and lawyers would have more cases). These
burdens may not be great, but it is hard to imagine how they would not
exist in some form. For that reason, any attempt to reduce or eliminate

103. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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advance initiative oversight is unwise on a practical level.
Furthermore, because advance initiative oversight process protects
the constitutional rights of Alaskans, it is unwise to modify the system
without considering the issues that would arise if the oversight were
reduced. Without the advance oversight process, laws could be passed
which might hurt individuals in a clearly unconstitutional manner, and
those individuals would have to seek relief after the fact. But if
something is known to be unconstitutional, it would clearly be better,
morally and politically, for it to not happen in the first place. The
advance oversight process realizes this goal. Any modifications to the
advance oversight of initiatives should therefore address this issue.
Keeping those concerns in mind, there is still at least one change to
Alaska’s initiative process that would benefit the state and its people:
the Lieutenant Governor should have no direct connections to the
Governor and instead be a truly independent office.
It is worth noting at the outset that this is not a change that would
benefit most states. Alaska’s unique system of elections with the
Lieutenant Governor, instead of the Secretary of State, at the head of the
Division of Elections,104 however, makes the position particularly
powerful and worthy of independent analysis and decision by the
voters.
There are two parts to this proposal. First, the Governor and
Lieutenant Governor should be voted on and elected independently
from each other. Second, a vacant Lieutenant Governor position should
be filled by election, or by following a consistent line of succession,
rather than by the appointment process currently in place.
Currently, Alaska requires that the Governor and Lieutenant
Governor be elected as a joint ticket.105 But because the Lieutenant
Governor’s office has unique responsibilities, it would be more
appropriate to have the two positions selected independently. For
example, the people may wish for a particular individual to hold the
position of Lieutenant Governor, but that individual may have personal
disagreements with the candidate likely to win the governorship and
therefore be unable to convince that candidate to include him or her on
the ticket. Alternatively, the people may actively desire to have
individuals from different political parties hold the two offices as some
form of check on the consolidation of power. This Note does not mean to
argue that the Governor and Lieutenant Governor will often represent
opposite parties, but giving Alaskans the ability to make that

104. ALASKA STAT. § 15.10.105(a) (2012).
105. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8.
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determination for themselves could be beneficial.
The second half of this proposal is more technical, but it stems from
the same concerns as the first. While the constitution specifically forbids
holding elections to fill such vacancy in the office of the Lieutenant
Governor, it allows laws to be passed which would establish a
continuing line of succession to the governorship.106 The current statute
that governs this issue provides that “the governor shall appoint, from
among the officers who head the principle departments of the state
government or otherwise, a person to succeed to the office of lieutenant
governor if the office of lieutenant governor becomes vacant.”107
Therefore, the line of succession to the office of Lieutenant Governor is
entirely determined, with legislative confirmation,108 by the Governor at
the point of vacancy, and is not necessarily consistent between
administrations.
The current process for filling Lieutenant Governor vacancies
leaves too much power in the hands of the Governor. Just as a particular
gubernatorial candidate may prevent a qualified candidate from
running on the same ticket as him or her, so too might a particular
Governor refuse to appoint an otherwise qualified successor. Instead of
allowing the Governor to determine who will be the Lieutenant
Governor in the case of a vacancy, Alaska should establish either a
standardized line of succession or allow for the election of a new
individual to fill the vacancy. Of these two possibilities, the former is
preferable.109
Having a standardized line of succession is preferable to the
current state of affairs because it would remove some of the influence
the Governor currently has over the Lieutenant Governor’s position.
Under the current system, if a Lieutenant Governor leaves office, the
new Lieutenant Governor is whomever the Governor has handpicked
for the position.110 With a set line of succession, the individual who
would ascend to the position of Lieutenant Governor would likely still
be selected by the Governor initially,111 but this is of less concern. As the
106. Id. § 13.
107. ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.040 (2012).
108. Id.
109. Establishing elections to fill vacancies in the Lieutenant Governor’s
office would require even more tinkering with Article III, Section 8 of the Alaska
Constitution, and may lead to counterintuitive results. For example, it would be
odd to have the Lieutenant Governor replaced via election while the Governor is
replaced by direct succession.
110. ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.040 (2012).
111. A rational line of succession would likely begin with the heads of the
various principal departments, who are themselves appointed by the Governor
and confirmed by the legislature. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 25.
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head of a principal department, presumably he or she will have been
chosen for that role based on his or her skills at performing that
particular job. It is mere happenstance that that position also places them
in the line of succession. This may at first seem unappealing, because the
alternative would be to have the Governor decide the next Lieutenant
Governor based on qualifications for that position rather than to have
the person chosen by chance. But if the Lieutenant Governor is truly
independent from the Governor (which the independent elections
discussed above are intended to reinforce), then allowing that single
individual to make the determination seems odd. The Governor should
not be the ultimate arbiter as to who would make the best Lieutenant
Governor, and therefore a consistent line of succession should be
established to remove the Governor from the decision-making process.
It is important to keep the concerns set out at the beginning of this
Part in mind when considering the two parts of this proposal: holding
separate elections for the Governor and Lieutenant Governor, and
establishing a standardized line of succession for the latter. Those
concerns are ensuring that the change would not increase the costs to the
state and taxpayers, and guaranteeing that the change would protect
Alaskans’ constitutional rights.
However, this proposal does not run afoul of those concerns to any
level that should be worrisome. While there may be some increase to
costs for the state to print slightly longer ballots to cover two races
rather than one, and to enact the laws necessary to realize the proposal,
these are minimal and not the sort of costs that raise concern. Costs are
concerning when they would lead to a large increase in the number of
questions being presented to voters or when litigation would result.112
But here no litigation will result from having two races for Governor
and Lieutenant Governor, or from having a clearly established line of
succession. Therefore, the first concern is alleviated.
This proposal also does not affect any individual’s constitutional
rights. Advance oversight over the initiative process would remain; the
only changes being made are to how the official who performs that
oversight is selected. By making that individual more accountable to the
people, and by ensuring that the Governor is as removed from the
selection of Lieutenant Governors as possible,113 this proposal simply
112. See discussion supra Part V.A.
113. See DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE, THE
EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN STATES xiii (“Initiatives are the last resort of desperate citizens, a way
to check the power of remote or arrogant lawmakers.”) (quoting Jeff Jacoby, A
Jewel in the Crown of American Self-Government, BOSTON GLOBE (June 7, 2001),
http://www.realdemocracy.com/jewel.htm).
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establishes the Lieutenant Governor’s position as one deserving of
careful consideration and respect.
Because establishing the Lieutenant Governor’s position as truly
independent from that of the Governor would neither interfere with
Alaskans’ constitutional rights nor lead to a substantial increase in state
expenditures, this proposal is not the sort that raises concerns about
tampering with the existing advance oversight of initiatives.

CONCLUSION
This Note has examined Alaska’s unique approach to the initiative
process. While Alaska is not alone in requiring initiatives to not be
clearly unconstitutional before placement on the ballot, it is unique
among states with an active initiative culture in placing the
responsibility for that determination in the hands of the Lieutenant
Governor. However, there are strong reasons both for advance oversight
of initiatives generally, and for having the Lieutenant Governor, at least
in Alaska, be the individual to exercise that power.
While the Alaskan initiative process is therefore commendable, it is
not without its minor flaws. In order to allow the people to truly choose
the person who will represent them for such an important task, the
Lieutenant Governor’s office should be more institutionally separated
from that of the Governor. This separation should take two forms: first,
the Lieutenant Governor and Governor should be elected separately
rather than as a single ticket; and second, the Lieutenant Governor’s line
of succession should be consistent between administrations and not left
entirely to the discretion of the Governor. But in making this change,
and especially in weighing any other modifications that would more
directly affect the substance of advance initiative oversight, Alaska
should be careful to consider both the costs to the state and the risk of
constitutional harm that could befall its citizens.

